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Abstract. In this paper I examine the sixth century Rule of St. Benedict, and 
argue that the authority structure of Benedictine communities as described in 
that document satisfi es well-known principles of authority defended by Joseph 
Raz. Th is should lead us to doubt the common assumption that pre-modern 
models of authority violate the modern ideal of the autonomy of the self. 
I suggest that what distinguishes modern liberal authority from Benedictine 
authority is not the principles that justify it, but rather the fi rst order beliefs for 
the sake of which authority is sought by the individual, and the degree of trust 
between the authority and the subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the ideas embraced by the West during the Enlightenment was 
the idea that the only authority that needs no justifi cation is the authority 
of the self over the self. Any other kind of authority is derivative. Phi-
losophers recognized that we cannot live without political authority, so 
an important project of the early Enlightenment was to show that the au-
thority of the state can ultimately be justifi ed by the authority of the self. 
Other kinds of authority were permitted to disappear, particularly moral 
and religious authority, both of which are still commonly dismissed as 
incompatible with personal autonomy. My purpose in this paper is not 
to critique modern ideas of autonomy or the self. Instead, I want to re-
examine the common assumption that pre-modern models of authority 
violate the modern ideal of the ultimate authority of the self.
My focus will be a document written by Benedict of Nursia almost 
1500 years ago describing an authority structure that has been followed 
in all subsequent centuries and on every continent. I have several reasons 
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for undertaking this unusual study. First, I want to show that authority 
as described in the Rule of St. Benedict satisfi es Joseph Raz’s theses of 
authority, one of the most infl uential contemporary accounts of modern 
liberal authority. Th is has some interesting implications. It shows that 
Benedictine authority need not refer to anything more than well-known 
post-Enlightenment principles for its justifi cation. It also shows that 
what distinguishes the modern liberal state from Benedict’s pre-modern 
authority structure is not the principles by which the authority is justi-
fi ed, but something else. Th e diff erence, I will suggest, is in the content of 
the fi rst order beliefs for the sake of which authority is accepted, and the 
degree of trust binding together authority and subject.
My second reason for looking at the Rule is that I believe a good way 
to understand authority is to examine structures of authority that have 
proven successful. Th is has some advantages over the alternative of mak-
ing up principles of authority a priori. I am not denying the usefulness of 
the latter, but I think there has been insuffi  cient attention to the former. 
Th ird, the political state is not a good model for authority in commu-
nities in which there are shared ends and a high degree of trust within 
the community. If we examine these communities closely, we might see 
that they have features that apply to communities that are not monastic, 
so the Benedictine model may have wider implications for the nature of 
authority in general.
II. JOSEPH RAZ’S THESES OF AUTHORITY
In an infl uential account of political authority, Joseph Raz proposes sev-
eral theses that he believes apply to authority simpliciter, and he then 
uses them to justify the authority of the modern state.1 In this section 
I will briefl y summarize Raz’s theses. I will not defend them since for the 
purposes of this paper I am relying upon their infl uence, not their truth. 
But I think they are all reasonable principles, given a modern sensibility 
that detaches authority from dependence upon God, and which attempts 
to derive authority from the more basic authority of the self. 
1 Joseph Raz, Th e Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).
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We begin with the assumption that authority is a relation between the 
person or institution in authority and the subject, in which the former 
has a special kind of normative power over the latter. Th e authority’s 
command or directive gives the subject a reason to act in the way di-
rected by the authority. Raz proposes that an authoritative directive has 
two constitutive features, both of which come from H.L.A. Hart.
Th e fi rst is content-independence: 
An authoritative utterance gives the subject a reason to follow the 
directive which is such that there is no direct connection between the 
reason and the action for which it is a reason.
Th at is, within certain limits, the authority’s authority2 does not de-
pend upon what the authority directs. Th e subject has a reason to obey 
regardless of the content. For instance, the authority can command me to 
drive on the left  side of the road or on the right. Th e authority can com-
mand military conscription or it can repeal it. Content-independence is 
necessary for a directive to be authoritative, says Raz, but it is not suf-
fi cient since threats and advice are also content-independent utterances, 
but they are not instances of authority (pp. 35-37).
Th e second thesis is the pre-emption thesis:
Th e fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a rea-
son for its performance that replaces other relevant reasons and is not 
simply added to them.
Th is thesis is the distinguishing feature of authoritative directives. Th e 
subject’s reason for following the directive is that it is a directive of the 
authority, not that the authority’s directive gives the subject additional 
reasons for doing the act directed. Th e latter would not be a case of obey-
ing authority, but a case of taking advice (pp. 42, 57-59).
Raz argues that there are cases in which a person ought to obey a di-
rective pre-emptively by off ering two other theses on authority which 
assume the primacy of the subject’s own reasons for action: the Depend-
ency thesis and the Normal Justifi cation thesis. Th e fi rst places limits on 
the kinds of reasons that an authority may legitimately use in giving its 
2 Th e term “authority” is ambiguous. Sometimes it refers to the person or institution 
that has authority, as when we say “Th e authorities closed down the streets around the 
bank aft er the heist.” Sometimes instead, it refers to the normative power that a person or 
institution has, as when we say, “Political authority diff ers from religious authority”. I will 
use the term in both senses and rely upon context to disambiguate it.
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directives. Th e second concerns the type of argument that would justify 
a claim to authority.
Raz’s Dependency Th esis is the following: 
All authoritative directives should be based on reasons that already 
independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to 
their action in the circumstances covered by the directive. 
Th e authority will consider more reasons for the directive than the 
reasons that already apply to the subject in the circumstances, but a con-
straint on his authority is that he must intend the directive to take the 
subject’s reasons into account (p. 47). For instance, I have reasons for 
wanting aff ordable, high quality health care that I cannot lose, but medi-
cal care providers, insurers, and drug companies are also subjects, with 
diff erent reasons which the authority must take into account in pass-
ing a law governing the way medical care is provided and paid for. Raz 
makes it clear that although the directive of legitimate authority must be 
intended to refl ect the reasons the subjects have, it need not correctly re-
fl ect those reasons. Th e legitimacy of its authority is not dependent upon 
its issuing the right directive. 
Th e normal way to justify authority is the Normal Justifi cation 
thesis (NJ thesis):
Th e normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person 
is to show that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons that 
apply to him if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authori-
tatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the 
reasons that apply to him directly (p. 53).
Th e idea here is that even an autonomous agent sometimes has reason to 
follow an indirect strategy in order to act on her own fi rst order reasons. 
She is doing what she judges she should do on the balance of reasons, but 
in some cases the balance of reasons dictates obeying the authority. For 
example, I want to build a squirrel-proof bird feeder in my back yard, but 
I do not know how to do it. If I fi nd an expert who off ers his assistance, 
I have reason to follow his directions since I am more likely to act in 
a way that serves my ends if I do so than if I try to fi gure it out myself. 
Raz proposes that the NJ thesis can justify the authority of the state. 
I have no position on whether he is right about that, but the NJ thesis 
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does plausibly link the reasonableness of obeying authority with reasons 
one has independent of the authority. A political authority is justifi ed if 
it helps me to act on my duties to others. An extension of the same prin-
ciple would justify religious authority if it helps me to act on my duties to 
God. Similarly, epistemic authority is justifi ed if it helps me get the truth, 
thereby aiding me in satisfying a duty to myself. Since I have these duties 
anyway, it is reasonable for me to accept the authority as authoritative in 
a specifi c domain. And if the authority’s legitimacy is justifi ed by what 
it is reasonable for me to accept, then the authority’s legitimacy can be 
justifi ed in this way.
Authorities clearly diff er in the degree of authority justifi ed by the NJ 
thesis. It is reasonable for me to follow the directives of the bird feeder 
expert if I want a good bird feeder, but it is not reasonable for me to agree 
to be punished if I do not obey. It does not help me act on my fi rst order 
reasons if I agree to such a strong kind of authority. But in other cases it 
does. I may do a better job of acting on some moral duties if I not only 
agree to obey a given authority, but also agree to be punished if I disobey. 
Th e authority of the state needs to be of this stronger kind. It must be 
strong enough to legitimate punishment for infraction of the laws.
Th ere is one other thesis of authority that Raz considers, but rejects. 
He says that the Dependency thesis is sometimes confused with what he 
calls the No Diff erence thesis:
Th e no diff erence thesis asserts that the exercise of authority should make no 
diff erence to what its subjects ought to do, for it ought to direct them to do 
what they ought to do in any event (p. 48).
Raz says this is false. If Parliament passes a tax law, it does not follow 
that the citizens had reason to pay the tax before the law was passed. If 
my Church commands me to go to Mass on Sunday, it does not follow 
that I had reason to do so anyway. If the bird feeder expert tells me to 
buy a certain kind of bracket, it does not follow that I had reason to buy 
a bracket like that in advance.
If we combine the NJ thesis and the pre-emption thesis, and formu-
late it from the point of view of the subject, we get the following general 
thesis of authority:
When I have reason to believe that following the directives of a puta-
tive authority makes it more likely that I will act on my fi rst order reasons 
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than if I try to act on those reasons directly, I should do what the author-
ity tells me to do pre-emptively.
My reason for accepting the authority does not depend upon the 
content of the authority’s directive (content-independence), and the au-
thority’s legitimacy is constrained by the principle that it must intend to 
refl ect my fi rst order reasons in its directives (dependency thesis).
I will end this summary with an objection to pre-emption and Raz’s 
reply. Someone might argue that the reasonable thing to do when an 
authority satisfi es the condition of the NJ thesis is to weigh the author-
ity’s directive more heavily than my other reasons, but still take my other 
reasons into account. Why isn’t the fact of the authority’s directive simply 
one more reason to act that I put into the mix of my total set of reasons? 
Th e answer is that when I have reason to think that an authority satisfi es 
the NJ thesis, I will do better at acting on my fi rst order reasons if I follow 
the authority’s directive pre-emptively than if I do not. Raz says: 
Suppose I can identify a range of cases in which I am wrong more than the 
putative authority. Suppose I decide because of this to tilt the balance in all 
those cases in favour of its solution. Th at is, in every case I will fi rst make up 
my own mind independently of the ‘authority’s’ verdict, and then, in those 
cases in which my judgment diff ers from its, I will add a certain weight to 
the solution favoured by it, on the ground that it, the authority, knows better 
than I. Th is procedure will reverse my independent judgment in a certain 
proportion of the cases. Sometimes even aft er giving the argument favoured 
by the authority an extra weight it will not win. On other occasions the ad-
ditional weight will make all the diff erence. How will I fare under this pro-
cedure? If, as we are assuming, there is no other relevant information avail-
able, then we can expect that in the cases in which I endorse the authority’s 
judgment my rate of mistakes declines and equals that of the authority. In 
the cases in which even now I contradict the authority’s judgment the rate of 
my mistakes remains unchanged, i.e. greater than that of the authority. Th is 
shows that only by allowing the authority’s judgment to pre-empt mine al-
together will I succeed in improving my performance and bringing it to the 
level of the authority. Of course sometimes I do have additional information 
showing that the authority is better than me in some areas and not in others. 
Th is may be suffi  cient to show that it lacks authority over me in those other 
areas. Th e argument about the pre-emptiveness of authoritative decrees does 
not apply to such cases (pp. 68-9).
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I think Raz’s argument is sound. Th e decision to obey pre-emptively is 
the best strategy given the assumption that I have identifi ed a person 
who is more likely to be right than I am about the best way to act on my 
own reasons for action. But we need models of the way to identify such 
a person. We will get to one way to do that in the next section.
Raz says he off ers his work as a contribution to the literature on polit-
ical freedom, and he aims to justify political authority within the frame-
work of political liberalism (p. 1). He begins with the general realm of 
authority over action in order to present the contours of authority as he 
understands it, but he does so with an eye to applying his theses to the 
political domain. I suspect that this means he is operating with certain 
constraints. 
One constraint is the desire to maximize political freedom and to 
minimize political authority. It is interesting that most modern political 
thought is motivated more by fear of bad authority than by desire for 
good authority. Th e idea is that it is more important to devise an account 
of authority that prevents tyranny than to give the bearer of authority 
the function of assisting the subjects in pursuing their individual and 
collective good.3 With such an aim, it is reasonable to devise principles to 
restrict authority as much as possible, compatible with having a tolerably 
smooth-functioning society. 
A second constraint is that the account must be applicable to authori-
ty over large populations with no presumption of personal trust between 
authority and subject. Th e strong personal bonds that exist in small com-
munities such as the family or the village cannot be assumed when the 
authority is distant from the subjects and there is no personal interaction 
between them. 
I am interested in the contours of authority in domains in which 
these constraints may not apply. Small communities with a great deal 
of personal interaction and bonding between authority and subject do 
not have the protection of the subject from the authority as a primary 
goal, which is not to say that subjects should not be protected. But I fi nd 
it interesting to test the way in which Raz’s principles would be applied 
in small, tightly-knit communities where the authority is stronger and 
3 Two exceptions are Yves Simon, A General Th eory of Authority (University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1980), and Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self 
(N.Y.: Basic Books, 2008).
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covers a much greater range of the subjects’ lives than political authority 
does. If the community has a religious basis, is there something distinct-
ively religious in the principles that justify authority in such communi-
ties? Could a modern liberal recognize the authority structure of these 
communities as legitimate? We are used to thinking of authority in the 
modern world as not only dependent upon certain principles deriving 
from the authority of the self, but as having a certain result – minimal 
intrusion in the lives of the subjects. In the next section I will turn to 
a model of authority that suggests that common assumptions about the 
diff erence between modern and pre-modern authority are false. 
 
III. THE RULE OF ST. BENEDICT
St. Benedict wrote his Rule in the fi rst half of the sixth century. More than 
a millennium before the advent of Constitutional government, Benedict 
understood the need for a combination of the authority of persons and 
the authority of a written rule known to all. Th is combination is impor-
tant to the justifi cation of authority in a Benedictine community, and 
it indicates one of the ways that modern liberal authority has separable 
elements. Th ere are successful structures of authority that have some of 
those elements and not others.
Benedict’s fi rst words are “Listen, carefully, my son, to the master’s 
instructions, and attend to them with the ear of your heart. Th is is advice 
from a father who loves you.” (trans. Timothy Fry).4 Th ink of the na-
ture of this appeal. Benedict does not say, “I am an authority and I claim 
that you have a duty to obey me.” He sets up a relationship of trust. “My 
words are addressed to you especially, whoever you may be, whatever 
your circumstances, who turn from the pursuit of your own self-will and 
ask to enlist under Christ, who is Lord of all, by following him through 
4 Th e Rule of St. Benedict in English, trans. by Timothy Fry (Collegeville, Minn: 
Liturgical Press, 1982). I use three translations of the Rule in the following discussion. 
Th e translations by Timothy Fry and Leonard Doyle follow Benedict in wording the Rule 
for communities of men. Since there were communities of women following the Rule 
from the beginning, the Barry translation explicitly words the Rule in a way that is appli-
cable to these communities as well. My discussion will primarily focus on communities 
of monks, but will vary with the context of the translation I am using.
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taking to yourself that strong and blessed armour of obedience which he 
made his own on coming in our world.” (trans. Patrick Barry).5 In the 
next few paragraphs Benedict reminds the monk of the fi rst order ends 
they share. He says, “Let us open our eyes to the light that can change us 
into the likeness of God,” and in the following paragraph he quotes the 
psalm, “Who is there with a love of true life and a longing for days of 
real fulfi llment?” (Barry). In the following paragraphs Benedict reviews 
the aims of the Christian who follows the Gospel. “Brothers, now that 
we have asked the Lord who will dwell in his tent, we have heard the in-
struction for dwelling in it, but only if we fulfi ll the obligations of those 
who live there.” (Fry). And in the concluding paragraph of the Prologue 
he says,
Th erefore we intend to establish a school for the Lord’s service. In drawing 
up its regulations, we hope to set down nothing harsh, nothing burdensome. 
Th e good of all concerned, however, may prompt us to a little strictness in 
order to amend faults and to safeguard love. Do not be daunted immediately 
by fear and run away from the road that leads to salvation. It is bound to be 
narrow at the outset (Fry).
Notice that there are ends stated at the beginning of the Rule, and Ben-
edict knows that each monk or seeker testing his monastic vocation has 
a reason to act for those ends. Within the space of a few paragraphs, Ben-
edict appeals to the monk’s fi rst order reasons for living, and the monk’s 
second order reasons for thinking that living as a monk under the Rule 
will help him live in the way he aims to live. Th e rules of Christian life 
are detailed in Chapter Four. Th ese are rules that apply to the Christian 
whether or not he decides to enter a monastery. Many readers have a sec-
ond order reason to take the authority of the Rule as a better way to act on 
the reasons given in Chapter Four than if they attempted it on their own.
Chapter One presents alternatives to the authority structure of a mo-
nastic community under a rule with an Abbot (or Abbess) and gives rea-
sons for rejecting them. Th is is a smart way to begin. Benedict is aware 
that there are monks who either live without authority or live without 
5 Th e Rule of St. Benedict, trans. by Patrick Barry (1997), in Th e Benedictine Hand-
book, introduction by Anthony Merritt-Crosby (Collegeville, Minn: Liturgical Press, 
2003).
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a rule, and he knows his readers will be aware of them. He considers four 
kinds of monks. Th e anchorites (hermits) can be self-reliant and do not 
live under an Abbot, but that is only because they have already learned 
what they need to learn in a monastery. Otherwise, they will not be able 
to go it alone. For the sarabaites the law is whatever they want to do, 
whatever strikes their fancy. Th ey are evidence of what happens when 
a monk follows his own will. Th e gyrovagues are the worst. Th ey drift  
from place to place, taking from others, and never committing to a com-
munity. Since they move so frequently, their misdeeds are easier to hide. 
Th e crucial point of this chapter is that it is not enough for a monk to 
take a rule and attempt to live by it without living under an authority. Th e 
reason for living in a community as a cenobite is partly that living with-
out authority tends to lead to gyrovagues and sarabaites, and partly that 
the tools of the spiritual craft  require living in community. Th e goal of 
the individual monk is personal salvation, but Benedict calls the reader 
to trust him and his experience in judging that living under the author-
ity of an Abbot according to the Rule is a better means to that end than 
following the monk’s own will.
Th e Rule describes the qualities of the Abbot as well as the ordinary 
monk and those with particular roles like the Cellarer, the Porter, and 
the Prior. Th e Rule sets out most of the structure of the monastic life, 
including the hours of the Divine Offi  ce and the psalms that shall be 
chanted, the amount of food and wine to be consumed, the treatment of 
the sick, punishment for infractions of the Rule, and so on. It describes 
the way the Abbot is elected and the responsibilities of the Abbot to the 
monks, as well as the responsibilities of the monks to the Abbot, and the 
responsibilities of the monks to each other. 
Th e Abbot is a teacher and spiritual mentor as well as a manager of 
the Abbey’s aff airs. A person who is good at one might not be good at 
the other, but it is clear that Benedict thinks that teaching is the more 
important role. Th e Abbot or Abbess “should give a lead to their disciples 
by two distinct methods of teaching– by the example of the lives they 
lead (and that is the most important way) and by the words they use in 
their teaching.” (ch. 2, Barry). Benedict directs the Abbot to personal-
ize his teaching and his discipline for the needs of the individual monk. 
One of his most touching pieces of advice to the Abbot is that he should 
“arrange everything that the strong have something to yearn for and the 
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weak nothing to run from.” (ch. 64, Fry). Benedict clearly intends the 
Abbot to be trustworthy, and the monk’s trust in him is grounded partly 
in the Abbot’s behavior, but for the most part it is grounded in the per-
sonal qualities that make him an exemplar of a life lived by the Rule.6 
Th e Rule satisfi es and expresses all of the theses about authority de-
fended by Raz. Benedict clearly implies that the Abbot’s directive pre-
empts the monk’s other reasons for performing an act. Further, the com-
mand should be obeyed immediately. “It is, in fact, almost in one single 
moment that a command is uttered by the superior and the task carried 
to completion by the disciple.” (ch. 5, Barry).
Raz’s Dependency thesis states that the directives of the authority 
should be based on reasons that independently apply to the subjects of 
the directives and are relevant to their action in circumstances covered 
by the directive. Benedict implies acceptance of this thesis in a number 
of places. For instance, in the chapter on the election of an Abbot (ch. 64) 
he says that “Th ey [the Abbot or Abbess] must understand that the call 
of their offi  ce is not to exercise power over those who are their subjects 
but to serve and help them in their needs.” (Barry). It was radical in sixth 
century Rome to present an image of authority that exists for the sake 
of the subjects. Th e Rule restricts the purpose for which an Abbot may 
issue directives, and it reminds the Abbot several times that he is under 
the Rule himself and will have to answer to God: “And let the Abbot be 
sure that any lack of profi t the master of the house may fi nd in the sheep 
will be laid to the blame of the shepherd.” (ch. 2, Doyle).7 Th e Abbot may 
issue directives for purposes of his own, but that is compatible with the 
Dependency thesis, as Raz mentions. Th e crucial point of the thesis is 
that the authority must intend to take into account the reasons that apply 
to the subjects individually in giving his directives. 
When the monk agrees to live under the Rule, he is under authority 
because he has accepted it, and his acceptance is grounded in reasons 
6 I believe that exemplars of virtue are not only crucial in moral training, but can 
play the central role in a form of moral theory I call exemplarist virtue theory. I out-
line such a theory in “Exemplarist Virtue Th eory,” forthcoming, Metaphilosophy, and 
give a detailed example of the way such a theory can be developed in Divine Motivation 
Th eory (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
7 Th e Rule of St. Benedict, trans. by Leonard Doyle (1948), (Collegeville, Minn: 
Liturgical Press, 2001).
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he had prior to his acceptance of the Rule. Benedict off ers the monk 
a second order reason to follow the Rule, and the Rule gives the monk 
a reason to obey the Abbot, and to accept the Abbot’s authority to in-
fl ict the punishments given in the Rule for violations of the rule, includ-
ing public apology for certain minor off enses, eating and praying alone 
for more serious off enses, and excommunication for the most serious 
off enses. So both the authority of the Rule and of the Abbot satisfy Raz’s 
Normal Justifi cation Th esis. Benedict says:
It is love that impels them to pursue everlasting life; therefore, they are eager 
to take the narrow road of which the Lord says: Narrow is the road that leads 
to life (Matt 7:14). Th ey no longer live by their own judgment, giving in to 
their whims and appetites; rather they walk according to another’s decisions 
and directions, choosing to live in monasteries and to have an abbot over 
them.” (ch. 5, Fry).
Th e Normal Justifi cation thesis also implies conditions under which an 
authority loses legitimacy. Because of the modern suspicion of authority, 
this is an issue that now gets considerable attention, but Benedict has 
a diff erent worry. His concern is that the fact that the Abbot is elected 
may not be enough to establish the legitimacy of his authority since the 
whole community might conspire to elect one who will consent to their 
“evil ways” (ch. 64). If that happens, it is the responsibility of the local 
bishop or ordinary Christians living nearby to intervene “to prevent so 
depraved a conspiracy.” But a modern reader will ask, what if the Ab-
bot is abusive and violates the Rule? Th ere does not seem to be a formal 
procedure for such cases, but Benedict discusses visitations from other 
abbeys (ch. 61) and the fact that the Abbot will have to give an account-
ing to God for the way he governed the monastery. What Benedict 
expected was that the Abbot would become lax rather than tyrannical, 
and the history of monasticism indicates he was right. Th e many reforms 
over the centuries usually resulted in the monasteries becoming more 
disciplined, not less so.8 
Benedict gives very clear directions on the qualities that an Abbot 
should have. He does not say that the Abbot loses his authority if he 
lacks these qualities, but he warns the Abbot again that there is a higher 
8 It is interesting that the only monastic order that has never needed reform is the 
Carthusians, which is also the strictest. 
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authority to whom he will one day have to answer. Th e Abbot has a strong 
motive to follow the Rule, and the Abbot is chosen from among monks 
who have already been following the Rule for many years. It is interest-
ing that the Rule is regularly read aloud (ch. 66). Not only does the Rule 
specify that the Abbot must submit to the Rule, but everyone in the mon-
astery knows that and is regularly reminded of it.
Th e Rule says that if the Abbot commands the monk to do something 
harsh, he should still do it. “Th e fourth step of humility is to go even 
further than this [obedience] by readily accepting in patient and silent 
endurance, without thought of giving up or avoiding the issue, any hard 
and demanding things that may come our way in the course of that obe-
dience, even if they include harsh impositions which are unjust.” (ch. 7,
Barry). In a later chapter he gives the steps a monk should take if the 
Abbot commands something too harsh (ch. 68). But there is no doubt 
that the Abbot does not lose authority by giving such commands, and 
the monk’s duty is to obey. Moreover, it is unlikely that this confl icts with 
the modern liberal notion of authority. Raz argues that an authority does 
not cease being an authority when the directives do not refl ect the sub-
jects’ fi rst order reasons for acting. It is only necessary that the authority 
attempt to do so (p. 41), and Raz makes it clear that even this is an ideal. 
It is suffi  cient if the authority attempts to refl ect the subjects’ reasons of-
ten enough to justify the power of the authority (p. 47). Similarly, an Ab-
bot might not always attempt to issue directives that refl ect the monks’ 
fi rst order reasons, and Benedict does not say that he loses authority in 
such cases. But egregious abuse of power would normally be detectable.
It is signifi cant that the monk can leave virtually any time he wants. 
(If he does, Benedict permits him to return up to three times). Th e NJ 
thesis gives grounds for authority in reasons the subject has for thinking 
that accepting the authority is likely to have a certain consequence. Th is 
does not mean that the authority loses its authority if the anticipated 
consequence does not occur, but in monastic communities and other 
voluntary communities, the subject has the option of rejecting the au-
thority by leaving the community. Th at gives him a stronger basis for 
accepting authority because casting his lot with the authority is not an 
irrevocable decision. If at some point in time, the authority’s behavior 
leads him to reject his second order judgment about the authority, he is 
free to reject it by leaving. 
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Benedict, like Raz, rejects the No Diff erence thesis. Authority is not 
authority if it does not create new obligations. Th e point of the new obli-
gations for Benedict is to create a special community in which Christian 
objectives and the following of the commandments of Christian life are 
easier to do. But it is important that obedience to authority in areas that 
do not directly pertain to his spiritual end as stated at the beginning of 
the Rule make it more likely that the monk will reach the spiritual end. 
So the monk may not see the connection in the particular case between 
the directive of the authority and the end he seeks. Th is might be a way 
in which the virtue of obedience in a monastic community diff ers from 
obedience to political authority. If the political authority issues a directive 
that seems to have nothing to do with their function, many of us would 
not trust the authority suffi  ciently to accept the directive as legitimate. 
For example, if the City Council issues an order that all persons must 
refrain from parking on the street on the fi rst Tuesday of the month, 
citizens typically expect to have a reason to think that the directive is 
within the scope of authority they have agreed to assign the council– for 
instance, that that is street-cleaning day.9 Th e citizen is under the coun-
cil’s authority in this respect even if the citizen disagrees with the need 
to refrain from parking for that reason, but the citizen needs reason to 
think that the council is issuing rules within the domain of its authority. 
In contrast, the authority of the Abbot extends to directives the relevance 
of which cannot be determined by the monk. But that diff erence, if there 
is one, is not in the conditions for legitimate authority, but rather in the 
trust that the subjects have in the authority. If the citizens trust the mem-
bers of their city council to issue directives in the appropriate domain, 
their attitude towards those directives will not diff er from those of the 
monk towards the Abbot. 
Raz’s theses of authority are general enough that they can ground 
both political authority in a modern liberal state and the tightly control-
led community life governed by the Rule of St. Benedict. As far as I can 
see, there is nothing in the modern view of authority that would prevent 
a Razian liberal from becoming a Benedictine monk or nun. Th e liberal 
9 Presumably most of us would obey anyway to avoid a fi ne, but the question I am 
raising is whether we would think that we are obeying legitimate authority when we 
do so.
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will be more aware of the limits of authority than we see expressed in the 
Rule, but I see no reason to think there is an incompatibility between the 
Rule and Raz’s theses. Obviously, the conditions for agreeing to live by St. 
Benedict’s Rule include much more than taking a certain line on author-
ity, but it seems to me that those conditions have nothing to do with the 
view of authority per se. What is distinctive about Benedictine authority 
is acceptance of the fi rst order reasons for living to which the Rule refers, 
and the degree of trust necessary to have a second order reason to ac-
cept the Rule as it is followed in a certain community as the best way to 
live by those reasons. What makes authority in these communities much 
stronger than political authority is the trust that binds authority and sub-
ject together, not the way in which the authority is justifi ed or exercised. 
I see no reason to think, then, that political liberals should deny the pos-
sibility of a community that satisfi es the conditions for liberal authority 
but has the radically pre-modern structure of a Benedictine community. 
Th e diff erence is in the degree of trust between authority and subject and 
the substance of the beliefs they share.
Th ere is an objection to the justifi cation of monastic authority that 
is sometimes made in the literature on autonomy, and is indicative of 
the common view that monastic authority is anti-modern. Th omas May 
discusses monasticism in the context of a discussion of whether a person 
can autonomously choose slavery.10 He says the life of a monk in a rig-
orously disciplined monastery “closely approximates the life of a slave.” 
(p. 138). Th e problem as May sees it is that the monk is not the “helms-
man” in the determination of action. 
Th e voluntary slave does not determine his action. Rather, he only deter-
mines that his action will not be determined by himself. While in cases such 
as the monk’s this determination may perfectly well be justifi ed, he nonethe-
less surrenders his autonomy to whatever authority he is obligated to obey.” 
(p. 139).
10 Th omas May, Autonomy, Authority, and Moral Responsibility (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1998), 138-9.
80 LINDA ZAGZEBSKI
May continues:
While it is true that the voluntary slave may “steer” toward slavery, once in 
slavery the slave is eliminated from the determination of his behavior. To 
voluntarily enter into slavery is tantamount to placing oneself under the di-
rection of an “automatic pilot”; one may autonomously place oneself in this 
condition but cannot be said to “steer” while under this condition (p. 139).
May believes that the monk gives up his autonomy when he becomes 
a monk, and he seems willing to go farther than that and to say that the 
monk has agreed to become something that closely approximates a slave. 
Th e stronger claim surely is too strong since the monk’s lack of control 
over the structure of his daily life hardly puts him in the category of 
a slave in his daily acts. It is not as if he decided to hand over to someone 
else each day the decision to tell him when to rise, when to chant the 
Divine Offi  ce, when to do his individual work, and so on. Th e times for 
each of these activities are prescribed by the Rule and the practice of the 
individual monastery, and since they are invariant, they were predict-
able at the time he became a monk. At that time he decided to get up at 
5:30 (for instance), chant Vigils at 6, breakfast at 6:30, and so on. So he is 
hardly subject to another person’s changeable whim.11 
But May fi nds lack of autonomy in being on “automatic pilot.” Th at 
suggests that he thinks of the monk as someone who mindlessly goes 
through a routine, thereby saving himself the trouble of having to make 
up his mind about what to do at each hour of the day. But that is a mis-
understanding of monastic life. Nobody can be the “helmsman” for her 
every act, so presumably the autonomous person exercises direct control 
over some of her acts, and indirect control over others, and a person who 
acts on authority justifi ed by the Normal Justifi cation thesis exercises 
indirect control over the acts that fall under that principle. Th e issue is 
which acts are direct and which are indirect, not whether there are any 
instances of the latter. 
Th e answer to that question depends upon what a person’s fi rst order 
reasons for action are. He might have reasons to act that are important 
11 Actually, the monk’s level of direct control over his daily activities is at least as great 
as the control persons have in the typical eight-hour daily job. Th e hours in which the 
monk does not have direct control are just distributed diff erently. 
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to him, and he might judge that he is much more likely to act upon them 
if he does not exercise direct control over many day-to-day acts which, 
according to his own beliefs, are of trivial importance. In the chapter from 
which the above passage is taken (ch. 6), May defends the position that 
authority is compatible with autonomy, and he accepts the Normal Jus-
tifi cation thesis.12 So suppose a person has fi rst order ends the probable 
attainment of which requires acting on authority in a domain including 
such things as when one rises, what and when one eats, and what prayers 
are said on certain days. Th en, given that May accepts the NJ thesis, he 
should agree that that person would be justifi ed in acting on authority 
in those cases. And since he believes that authority is compatible with 
autonomy, he should agree that the person would be acting autonomous-
ly. It seems to me, then, that May can deny that the monk is autonomous 
only if he thinks that the monk’s fi rst order ends themselves contradict 
autonomy. Th at would mean that autonomy is not a principle or value 
that says an agent should be governed by his own reasons; it precludes 
the possession of certain reasons. I fi nd this implausible if autonomy 
is something valuable, and in any case, it goes counter to the presump-
tion of political liberalism that persons are permitted to determine their 
own ends.
VI. MODERN AUTHORITY, MONASTIC AUTHORITY,
AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
Our foray into the Rule of St. Benedict has some interesting implica-
tions for the relationship between modern and traditional authority, 
and I think it can help us understand the justifi cation of authority in the 
modern world outside the walls of a monastery, including communities 
that are neither monastic nor political. 
Treatments of authority virtually always interpret modern authority 
as diff ering from pre-modern authority in (a) structure and degree, and 
(b) the principles used to justify it. Indeed, it is generally assumed that 
the contrast in (a) can be explained by a contrast in (b). Th at is, the 
12 May, 136-7. May argues for a revision of Raz’s Dependency thesis in that chapter.
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explanation for the striking change in the strength and range of author-
ity in the modern period is that the modern liberal interprets authority 
as deriving from the individual’s authority over herself, whereas nobody 
would have justifi ed authority that way before the modern era. Instead, 
pre-moderns believed that all authority comes from God. I think that 
the Rule of St. Benedict shows that this assumption is mistaken. Th e 
structure of Benedictine authority is obviously pre-modern, yet it can 
be justifi ed on the same principles that justify the modern liberal state. 
Th e diff erences in the outcome of the application of those principles 
must therefore be due to other features of the community over which the 
authority governs. I have proposed that the diff erence is in the content of 
the fi rst order reasons for the sake of which authority is accepted, and the 
degree of trust between authority and subject. If I am right about that, 
liberal authority is no more justifi ed by reference to the authority of the 
individual than is Benedictine authority. I am not, of course, suggesting 
that Benedictines should think of authority in their communities as jus-
tifi ed by Razian principles. But those persons who accept such principles 
should judge that Benedictine authority is legitimate for those with the 
relevant fi rst order ends. As I mentioned, they might personally disagree 
with those ends, but a mark of political liberalism is the presumption 
that individuals have the right to set their own ends. With that assump-
tion, it is very hard to see on what grounds the political liberal can claim 
that authority in a Benedictine monastic community is illegitimate. 
In spite of the fact that Benedictine authority is considerably stronger 
and has much greater scope than the authority of the modern state, it 
has some of the central features of a constitutional democracy. Author-
ity exists for the sake of the governed, the Abbot is elected, and the Rule 
has a function similar to that of a constitution. We are used to thinking 
of these features as accompanied by other features of a representative 
democracy, and so it may be surprising to see how unlike a democracy an 
authority structure with these features can be. Th e diff erence in the trust 
between authority and subject is no doubt related to other diff erences, in 
particular, the fact that the constraints on political authority mentioned 
at the end of section II are not applicable in many communities. Political 
authority must apply to large and oft en diverse populations, and there is 
no escape from it. It cannot be assumed that the subjects have common 
ends, with the exception of the recognition of basic human rights, but 
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some of these are designed to protect the subjects from the authorities 
rather than from each other. Historical memories are of abuses of power, 
and so modern political thought tends to be motivated more by fear of 
bad authority than by desire for good authority. With these constraints it 
is no wonder that modern accounts of political authority attempt to not 
only ground authority in the rational will of the individual subject, but 
they also aim to minimize political authority as much as is feasible. In 
contrast, authority in a monastic community is not accepted as a nece-
ssary evil, but as a means to obtaining goods for the subjects, and the 
historical memory is not dominated by stories of tyranny. Because the 
communities are small and voluntary, they do not need to operate with 
the constraints necessary for governance over large and diverse popula-
tions. But if I am right, these features do not aff ect the principles justify-
ing authority, but rather the form it takes in diff erent communities. 
Th is suggests that since Razian principles do not dictate that autho-
rity has a particular structure– e.g., a democracy, it is possible that 
there are other communities whose authority structure is justifi ed on 
modern liberal principles, but which diff er signifi cantly from the struc-
ture of governance of the modern state because of a diff erence in the 
ends of the subjects and the level of trust within the community. Given 
that a subject can be reasonable in obeying pre-emptively the directives 
of a trusted individual, it also seems possible that a subject could have 
a reason to obey a trusted institution whose historical tradition is one 
with which she identifi es, and which she reasonably believes is a better 
guide to her ends than she is when she is acting on her own. Th at is, she 
might reasonably trust the institutional embodiment of a tradition with 
an authority structure that issues directives governing some part of her 
life more than she trusts herself in that domain. If so, Raz’s NJ thesis jus-
tifi es her in acting pre-emptively on the commands of the institutional 
authority.
Institutions such as the Catholic Church have some of the features 
of political authority and some of the features of monastic authority. 
Th ere are obviously many shared fi rst order reasons for action within the 
Church, but the number of subjects is huge and the level of trust varies. 
But I suspect that authority in some religious institutions such as the 
Catholic Church might be justifi ed on Razian principles even though 
the structure of authority in these institutions is nothing like that of the 
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modern liberal state. In any case, the way in which the structure and 
strength of authority is separable from its justifi cation is worth further 
investigation for the case of religious authority. 
I think that these considerations also suggest the desirability of fur-
ther work on the connection between authority and autonomy, particu-
larly in the case of religious authority, and probably also moral author-
ity. Kant thought that the autonomous person needs self-discipline in 
order to avoid having a heteronomous will, a will determined by incli-
nation– either one’s own or that of a dominant other. Th e autonomous 
person is rational, and it takes self-control to be rational. Sometimes the 
autonomous person needs to have the self-discipline to obey when her 
own reason tells her to do so. At least, I have not yet seen a convincing 
argument that a monastic does not have such a reason, nor that mo-
nasticism takes away autonomy. If it does not, that leaves open the pos-
sibility that there are other forms of authority that are compatible with 
autonomy. 
 
